Aviation safety reporting where every report is read, scored with the aircraft's history and routed the same day, and the safety analyst signs
Every report routed the same day, every repeat linked before it is scored.
See one case, screen by screen ↓Aviation safety reporting is how an airline collects, reads, classifies, risk-scores and routes the hazard and occurrence reports its employees file — pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers and ramp agents. Aviation Safety Reporting does that work with eight AI agents: they read every report as it is filed, classify it in your event types, link the aircraft's history, score it on your risk matrix, check which notices apply and propose owners, and the safety analyst decides and signs.
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Aviation safety reporting starts with the people who see the hazard: pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers and ramp agents. The FAA's SMS rule asks every Part 121 carrier for a confidential employee reporting system and for its data to be analyzed. In most safety offices a small team of analysts reads each narrative by hand, picks an event type, scores it on the risk matrix mostly from the report alone, decides whether the NTSB, the FAA, DOT, OSHA or EASA must be told and by when, and emails it to an owner.
The risk sits in the reports that look routine. The second and third report about the same oven on the same aircraft are each scored as if they were the first, so the pattern never reaches Maintenance. A Service Difficulty Report is due 96 hours after the reporting period and an OSHA hospitalization report within 24 hours, so a report read on day three has already missed its clock. And reporters rarely hear what happened, which is how a reporting culture goes quiet.
Estimated split for about 70 overnight reports at a large network carrier, by hand and with the solution, in analyst hours.
Eight specialist agents read, score, link and route every report, and a blind second reader checks them; the analyst decides and signs.
On Corvane Airways flight CV 66 from San Francisco to Tokyo, a purser smelled burning electrical insulation at aft galley oven 3 of the 787-9 N834CV. She filed a confidential cabin safety report from Narita. Here is how Dana Whitfield, a safety analyst in Corporate Safety, works it with the agents the next morning, screen by screen, in the working solution.
Dana's Today screen says the agents read 71 reports overnight: 13 need her, 58 are ready to confirm with both readers agreeing, and 5 notices are open, the nearest the OSHA clock for a ramp injury at Denver, due today 15:10 MT. Each report that needs her shows the agents' reason first: “High · three events on one oven · FAA notice likely.” She can ask the agents about any report, aircraft, station or rule from the same screen.
“8 more on the tray · 953 reports this month, 99.2% routed the same day.”
The 58 Low reports where both readers agree on every field, and none needs a notice, wait off the tray. Dana reads a sample of five, sees where all 58 will go — Ground Safety 19, Technical Operations 14, Cabin Safety 10 and the rest — and confirms them with one signature. Every report is still logged one by one.
“I have read the sample and confirm all 58; thank-you notes go to the reporters.”
The report opens in the middle of the tray with a two-line summary Dana can have read aloud, and the reporter's own words below it; her identity is held by Safety. The Report Reader has found a second report of the same event from another flight attendant, 93% the same, and offers a merge. The Classifier proposes Cabin · smoke and fumes · galley equipment, mapped to the ICAO category SCF-NP, at 96%, and the Second Reader, reading blind, agrees.
“This is the second time I have smelled this on this aircraft — I think it was the same oven last month.”
The Similar Reports Finder links two earlier reports on oven 3 of N834CV — an electrical smell on Sep 29, scored 2D Low and sent to Inflight Services only, and a hot plastic smell with a tripped breaker on Oct 6, scored 2C Low — plus the Oct 6 tech log entry, the Narita work order deferring the oven under MEL 25-31-01 with its element insulation discolored, and a failed oven element on N829CV in July. On Corvane's matrix, two or more events on the same unit in 30 days make likelihood 4. The Risk Scorer moves the report from 2B Medium to 4B High and cites each step.
“Three events on oven 3 of N834CV in 16 days. The first two were scored Low and never reached Technical Operations.”
The Second Reader scores likelihood 3, Remote: the earlier two reports had no haze, so it reads this as the first event with haze, 3B Medium. Both arguments sit side by side. Dana chooses 4 Occasional, 4B High, with the reason code “Repeat on the same unit”, and the Risk Scorer keeps her decision as an example for the next report like it.
The Risk Scorer never lowers a score a person set, and a High always goes to a person.
The Notice Checker finds an FAA Service Difficulty Report likely under 14 CFR 121.703(a)(5), due Mon, Oct 19, 09:00 PT. An NTSB notice under 49 CFR 830.5(a)(4) needs an in-flight fire, and none was reported, so one question decides it. Dana sends it to Maintenance Control; Owen Hartley answers that the teardown photos show no flame or soot, the insulation discolored and no burn-through. Dana starts the SDR clock for Reliability, Technical Operations, and the Notice Checker will remind the filer 48 and 24 hours before it is due.
“Any evidence of flame or burning in the oven teardown?”
The Router proposes Technical Operations, which owns the oven through Maintenance Control, with Cabin Safety second for the crew procedure, a 4-hour accept time for a High, and the VP Corporate Safety informed. The Reporter Liaison drafts a thank-you in plain words with no codes. Dana approves it, confirms and signs, and the report slides into its owners' lanes while the next one comes up.
“Thank you for your report on CV 66. It has gone to the teams that own the aft galley ovens and cabin safety, and it is linked to two earlier reports about the same oven.”
The Notices screen lists every clock the Notice Checker has tested against the NTSB, FAA, DOT, OSHA and EASA rules: the OSHA in-patient hospitalization report for the Denver ramp injury with 6 hours left and a draft ready for Tom Brennan, the DOT hazmat written report on Form F 5800.1 for a power bank fire, an EASA occurrence report under EU 376/2014, and the NTSB call operations control already made. The agents draft and remind; a named person files.
“5 open, none missed this year.”
Technical Operations' incoming lane now shows SR-2026-18342 with its 4B High score, the reason — the third event on oven 3 in 16 days, deferred at Narita — and the SDR due date. Owners see the reporter's role, never the name. The Router tracks accept times and nudges an owner before a report is late; one Medium report in this lane is already 6 hours late.
Accept times: High 4 hours, Medium 2 business days, Low 5.
The Trend & Learning agent drafts the summary for the Safety Review Board: 441 reports in the week, 99.1% routed the same day, 6 High, 0 notice clocks missed, and the two readers agreeing on 94.6% of fields. It flags cabin odor and fumes as rising, 23 reports and up 9, with the oven 3 repeat, and proposes rule R-14 so galley smells always reach Technical Operations. Marcus edits it and signs.
“The agent drafts; the Manager edits and signs.”
The same cabin smoke report, seen by the four people at Corvane who carry it — what their week looked like, and what it looks like now.
Eight specialist agents read, score, link and route every report, and a blind second reader checks them; the analyst decides and signs.
Reads every report from the phone app, web form, safety mailbox, the acquired airline's legacy form and paper scans; pulls the flight, tail, station and phase from the operations schedule; finds second reports of one event.
Proposes the event type from the airline's list of 61, mapped to ICAO occurrence categories, with the sentences behind it.
Re-reads the narrative blind, classifies and scores it on its own, and votes on every field.
Links past reports, tech log entries, MEL deferrals, work orders and flight data events on the same aircraft, system and station, and answers questions across all reports.
Scores severity and likelihood on the airline's 5×5 risk matrix and shows how the aircraft's history moved the score.
Tests every report against NTSB 49 CFR 830.5, FAA 14 CFR 121.703, DOT 49 CFR 171.15/171.16, OSHA 29 CFR 1904.39, FAA AC 70-2 and EU 376/2014; asks the deciding question, drafts the notice and starts the clock.
Proposes owners and accept times, reminds owners before a report is late, and drafts the reporter's thank-you and the “what we did” note.
Writes the weekly triage summary from every decision, and turns repeated corrections into proposed rules tested on 90 days of reports.
Decide every routing, approve every rule. The agents propose; a named person decides.
Ask about any report, aircraft, owner or rule, or tell the agents what to do. Every answer points to its source, and nothing changes without a person.
Why is SR-2026-18342 High?
Severity B, Hazardous: haze in the cabin from an electrical source. Likelihood 4, Occasional: it is the third event on aft galley oven 3 of N834CV in 16 days. As a single report it would be 2B Medium. The Second Reader says 3; you decide.
Which notice clocks run out first?
OSHA for the DEN ramp injury: today 15:10 MT, draft with Tom Brennan. EASA for the FRA rejected takeoff: Sat, Oct 17, 06:30 UTC. FAA SDR for N834CV oven 3: Mon, Oct 19, 09:00 PT. None missed this year.
Show every galley oven smell on the 787-9
Six reports in 2026; three on N834CV oven 3 in the last 16 days, and N829CV oven 2 failed in July.
Send galley smell reports to Technical Operations from now on
I can't change routing on my own. I drafted rule R-14: smell, haze or smoke with galley equipment adds Technical Operations. On the last 90 days it raises agreement with analysts from 93.9% to 95.1% and changes 31 reports, none wrongly. Marcus Lee approves it.
13 screens from the working solution, on its sample data. Pick one to see it large.
Your event types, risk matrix, routing rules, notice rules and accept times are settings. Every change is a new version the Manager approves.
| Setting | Default | Choose from |
|---|---|---|
| Let the agents route agreed Low reports without a person | Off | Off · On, with the Manager's sign-off, reviewed monthly |
| Classifier says “I'm not sure” below | 80% | A confidence you set |
| Merges of one event offered above | 90% | A confidence you set |
| Owner accept times | High 4 hours · Medium 2 business days · Low 5 business days | Set per risk band |
| Notice rules and who files each | 6 rules | NTSB 49 CFR 830.5 · FAA 14 CFR 121.703 · DOT 49 CFR 171.15 / 171.16 · OSHA 29 CFR 1904.39 · FAA AC 70-2 · EU 376/2014 |
| Notice reminders | Filer 48 and 24 hours before · Manager 12 hours before | On · Off, each |
| Risk matrix | 5×5, revision 6, SMS Manual chapter 4 | Changed only by the Accountable Executive's delegate |
| Who sees reporter names | Safety Analyst and Manager | Per role; owners see the reporter's role |
Every figure is labelled: a target the solution is built to, an estimate, a typical published result, or a proven one.
“demo” = seen in the working solution, on its sample data · “target” = the design goal, measured in the live solution · “estimated” = our estimate of where an analyst's hours go · “typical” = published figures (one large airline about 600 reports a month, HAL preprint; 14 CFR 121.703(d), Service Difficulty Report within 96 hours after the reporting period; 29 CFR 1904.39, in-patient hospitalization within 24 hours). 14 CFR 5.71, 49 CFR 830.5, 49 CFR 171.15 and 171.16, FAA AC 70-2, FAA AC 120-66C, EU Regulation 376/2014 and ICAO Doc 9859 are named as context only. Corvane Airways, Larkspur Air, their aircraft, flights and reports, and the people named on this page are fictional — characters and sample data in the working solution.
Aviation safety reporting is how an airline collects, reads, classifies, risk-scores and routes the hazard and occurrence reports its employees file — pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers and ramp agents. Aviation Safety Reporting does that work with eight AI agents: they read every report as it is filed, classify it in your event types, link the aircraft's history, score it on your risk matrix, check which notices apply and propose owners, and the safety analyst decides and signs.
The FAA's SMS rule asks for a confidential employee reporting system and for its data to be analyzed. In this solution every report is read and classified, the reporter's identity is held by Safety while owners see only the role, and a weekly triage summary is drafted from every decision for the Manager to sign.
The Notice Checker tests each report against 49 CFR 830.5, 14 CFR 121.703, 49 CFR 171.15 and 171.16, 29 CFR 1904.39, FAA AC 70-2 and EU 376/2014. An SDR for smoke or fumes from a component failure in flight is due within 96 hours after the reporting period; the NTSB must be told at once of an in-flight fire. The Notice Checker quotes the clause, asks the one question that decides it — on the sample report, whether the oven teardown showed any flame — and drafts the notice with its due time. A person starts the clock and files.
The Risk Scorer scores severity and likelihood on your own matrix — 5×5 in the sample, from the SMS Manual — after the Similar Reports Finder has linked earlier reports, tech log entries and MEL deferrals on the same aircraft and system. It shows how the history moved the score, so a third event on one galley oven is scored 4B High, not 2B Medium.
A Second Reader re-reads every report blind and votes on every field; any disagreement goes to the analyst with both arguments. Below 80% confidence the Classifier says “I'm not sure” and shows both candidates. In the sample week the two readers agreed on 94.6% of fields, and analysts corrected 28 proposals with a reason code.
No. They are handed to their own programs untouched: ASAP reports to the Event Review Committee under the program described in FAA AC 120-66C, fatigue reports to the fatigue program. The agents do not read or score ASAP or fatigue narratives, so the protections of those programs hold, and they stay off the notice list because those programs check their own notices.
Yes. Agents never file, send or close anything. The safety analyst confirms every routing and every notice with a reason code and signs; downgrading a High, a new routing rule and the weekly summary need the Manager, Safety Reporting. Letting agents route agreed Low reports on their own is off by default and needs the Manager's sign-off.
The Agentic Solution Engine builds and deploys it from your requirements and documents — your event types, risk matrix, routing rules, notice rules and a sample of past reports — and it goes live once every quality gate has passed. We will walk you through it on your own de-identified reports first.
Every ASAP report ready before the ERC meets, every action tracked to closure.
1-min demoSafety Investigation ManagementReports drafted in days, not weeks, with every finding tied to its evidence.
1-min demoSafety Risk ManagementEvery hazard owned, scored on this week's evidence, and ready for the FAA.
1-min demoWe'll run Aviation Safety Reporting on a sample of your own de-identified safety reports, event types and risk matrix.